Interpreting "living in my own world"

Over time, the people I get close to tend to remark that I am "living in my own world" either as a backhanded complement or as a straight out insult when an argument occurs. And upon reflection weeks after the last had occurred, I thought it be a good exercise in dwelling. Not only has this remark passed its regular cycle of concern, I have come back to it to give an interpretation of it through dwelling.

The concept of "living in my own world", if we are to interpret it phenomenologically, does not support a Cartesian "duality". I take it that what he/she meant is that I am a subject engaging with objects in reference to me as a subject rather than taking everything into consideration (if we talk in Cartesian tradition). If anything, the remark calls me egotistic, focusing so much on the "I" and forgetting that there is a world to consider outside the "I".

If we allow a longer period of time to dwell on it, where emotions ad hominem are filtered out in favor of this exercise in phenomenological ontology. And I don't mean to interpret the expression as a kind of apology (defense). Instead, this interpretation acts as both an exercise and a way to understand the kind of criticism levied against me so I may understand and acknowledge it more deeply.

This blog's foundation is grounded on trying to reconstruct this notion of being through dwelling and what's part of that is to make clear that Cartesian duality (mind and body) isn't the ultimate interpretation. Frankly I'm guessing Elijah would outright go and say it's wrong. However, it doesn't do much to simply cast it aside.

The word "egotistic" or "pretentious" can be levied around either implicitly through expressions such as "you're stuck in your own head" or by straight up saying one is "egotistic". These expressions are value-judgments and implicitly support the Cartesian subject-object distinction– it's in the language. But this may simply be Descartes and his followers bandwagoning the structure of language. Extremist Heideggerians may go as far as saying there is no consciousness. This is polarizing.

Frankly, I don't doubt that there is consciousness, and I think Heidegger doesn't either. However, I think that when saying I "[live] in my own world", the notion of world may be somewhat distorted when taking a person's "world" to be an expression of a person's mind and its projection into the world. And this kind of interpretation may lead to thinking of Heidegger as a structuralist, that our experiences in the world are simply a result of the structure we are born in.

Although there may be small hints of truth in this interpretation, it is dismissive of the kind of point Heidegger is trying to make. Heidegger is "pre-structuralist" in a sense but doesn't focus on the structure. Instead, Heidegger is more interested in the notion of being-in-the-world. That being is intrinsically a part of and in the world. Perhaps what my dear friend meant wasn't a Cartesian notion, or at least I hope so. Instead, the critique levied against me is how I am engaging in the world as not having a proper structure of world hood in his/her eyes.

And the frustration that comes from the "in your own world" is dependent on the possessive "your own'. Within language, which is the "dwelling place of being" that Elijah quoted Heidegger in his essay, we can infer the kind of frustration it is from being a Dasein. 

Dasein cannot truly understand the condition of another Dasein. Each person is stuck within the hermeneutic circle– the circle of interpretation. And the frustration comes from never being able to understand another. However, the approach in trying to understand someone based on one's view of another's engagement with world, is not a helpful approach because it tempts the presence-at-hand mode of being– that is, looking at a being in terms of a kind of theoretical understanding qua Descartes, Kant and Hegel.

But if the Dasein is approaching another Dasein as ready-to-hand– the kind of being that a person normally engages in, that is a practical engagement with the world. The critique levied is the world hood structure Elijah was talking about in the previous essay– the "towards which", "for the sake of which", etc.

That is in colloquial terms– the inferred final cause of my action that my friend takes as being fundamentally flawed as a kind of inauthenticity. However, engagement with Das man or the "crowd" exposes a kind of inauthenticity. Authenticity is an engagement of Dasein with his own existence. When Dasein is not doing that, it becomes inauthenticity.

However, one may notice that in questions of authenticity, there is rarely any value judgments. The only suggestion Heidegger gives in response to living a more authentic time was a scoff "spend more time in graveyards", alluding to his notion of being authentic through realizing that Dasein is being-towards-death.

So turning to Heidegger doesn't give any suggestion of morality or ethics, how we should behave. We don't have to spend all our time in graveyards. That would be missing the point. Instead, I think we have to think for ourselves and our own final causes. Why do we do any actions? For the sake of what? What is our goal?

And particularly, my friend's criticism is right. if my goal was to engage in a moment of friendship by listening to what he/she is sharing, then I should be engaged in that.

What I think she/he means when she/he says that I'm living in my own world, I now interpret as a criticism of me not expressing concern/care for the world wherein my identity is to be a friend for him/her.

Touché