What accompanies an authenticity crisis? The very thing that brought it about– idleness. And idleness breeds temptations by the flesh. But however we get there, we're there– what happens then? The prayer life despite being followed suddenly feels insincere. The very liturgy of the hours that upholds the public office of the church is suddenly scrutinized. If I pray with others, shouldn't I feel their sense of prayer? It's a call to prayer isn't it? Liturgy of the hours. What does liturgy mean? These things, I haven't thought before but I knew love wasn't present as a tendency to resentfulness occupied me. But what I need to realize is that the thing I'm projecting on others is the very thing I need for myself. The public prayer life always comes with the temptation to consider authenticity– when we pray with others we either are insecure if we are praying as "hard" as others or if others aren't praying as sincerely as us.
5 “And when you pray, do not be like the hypocrites, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and on the street corners to be seen by others. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward in full.6 But when you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father, who is unseen. Then your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you. (Matthew 6:5-6)
And it's in the latter verse where I'm tripping up. I pray the liturgy of the hours or the rosary and it doesn't feel as rewarding. I'm just doing prayer rather than paying attention to that inward sense of God in the midst. My lips move but my heart hardens. I'm in that point where it's hard to believe God can forgive a person who sins not long after He's forgiven him. And I know that's the incredible love God has for us. I know that. I should want to participate in this love through prayer. But how I've let myself fallen that now prayer is an obstacle because I've (and am) taking it for granted. Can I go to confession in 30 minutes with this? I'm confused more than I am contrite. The answer is probably yes. The temptations are sneaky then, aren't they? Cunning almost. It has attacked the foundation I've built up to try and combat it (prayer) by zeroing in on my sin that started this whole week. But perhaps I've forgotten what Father Casey was saying. I should strive to live a holy life not solely a pure one, for purity comes from living a holy life.
I should probably go, and I should probably walk instead of driving there. What have I done today that's worthy of the convenience of driving? I know I'm called there because there is where I can find myself and work on my relationship with God to a greater authenticity and with a greater assent of faith.
I'm coming Lord, for even as I sin do I still continue to search you. Forgive your prideful sinner and humble him to your love, impart knowledge and courage to resist temptation so that he may participate in the love that You freely give. Amen.
While running today and listening to "Jesus of Nazareth" by Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI (or Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger), I was caught up thinking about the call to evangelize (cf. Mark 16:15– "And he said to them, 'Go into all the world and preach the gospel to the whole creation'")– to be priest, prophet and king (CCC 783)– even as lay Christians. It is easy enough to live in a community of faith, where each person can (ideally) bring each other up and support the journey to faith. This is best exemplified in my life with my Bible studies and general encounters with my girlfriend Arie. For situations like this, it is easy to relate to my fellow faithful Christians. We all have a common orientation to the good that is epitomized in the trinity as father, son (word) and spirit (breath).
It is of much more considerable difficulty in responding appropriately to the call to preach the gospel in secular society, of which make up general life outside of the people of faithful I know. Not only is the difference in orientation on what "good" is different (in fact it is respectfully and arguably diminished in secular short term thinking), it is difficult already to communicate the faith (even if it is my own) to others.
This is of considerable question to me as a Catholic (as opposed to other denominations), because the faith teaches us of the urgency to seek others to conversion. As far as I've experienced in my albeit limited exposure to weekly Sunday worship in Arie's Victory church, it seems that the focus is on strengthening the Christian communities and to pray for other people to be awakened by their faith. I support this rather brandished statement by last week's sermon that quoted theologians saying that our faith was imparted to us by God and is not a result of our doings and that everything we do and are in relation to God comes from Him because we are saved by faith alone.
While Catholics actually also agree that faith alone is necessary to be saved and that faith is given to us by God, the emphasis of mission in Catholicism leads us to center our attention on what's next, often citing the often not defended James 2:26: For just as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is also dead.". In our discussion I think Arie concedes this point to me, even without having to rely on our own denominations, that works are indeed essential if only to emphasize and reflect our faith that God has graced us with. As far as I can be certain of my Catholic faith, it is of our mission to spread the good news especially to the poor and those suffering. Where does this begin? I'd like to think it starts with the family, and of most concern are my sisters, even my older sister already married with children.
It is certainly much easier to rely on authority to communicate and remind my sisters of what the faith is. Certainly it is a safe enough position to take. However, authority only works when the authority is authorized by who they are instructing. In another sense, Mica and Anya have to look to me for something they recognize as needing advice on. In my scenario with them, this is not necessarily the case. Mica's mantra has focused on "you do you", probably not to the extent of doing serious harm unto oneself but allowing a kind of "learn from your mistakes" kind of approach. While it is agreeable to let someone "learn from their mistakes", I have now come to the position to disagree on being neutral about anything. Being neutral means to take a stance saying at worst I don't "care" about what you decide, often adding the existentialist "so long as you truly choose it but be aware of the ramifications". The ramifications of leaving it up to the "individual" is a symptom of modernity's failed ideal still being spun, that "man is the measure of all things"; in other words, relativism.
But in our specific case it doesn't actually have to be this idealistic. I think such ideas have penetrated into our conscience entrusted into us by our mother, who often let us to decide on our own. This is just only part of the story, because I indeed have also fallen away from the faith and searching for truth. What we often forget is that mom puts trust in the institutions that take care of us, from La Salle and Woodrose to BSM and to our colleges. They in a sense outsourced the parenting, often preferring to be moral guidance if sought rather than being active. They leave us alone in that sense.
So it would be no surprise that my sisters and I have adopted that kind of idea. I'm still privy to such a solution, I think trying to figure it out on your own is a good thing. But only if we actually know we have something to figure out. If we blatantly ignore what exactly it is we are being left alone to do, then most would just realize "I'm free to do anything". That kind of idea is dangerous and actually misses the point of this idea of "letting be". Heidegger for one has advocated a philosophical "letting be", giving up trying to appropriate "being" and instead letting it come and preferring to describe it poetically (while still being somewhat philosophical). But back to this point of contention, Mica's problem for me seems to be not that she is solely "free to do anything", but such a statement comes out of feeling that she was done injustice for her life trajectory which was given to her. She likes living in New York and being amongst other peers, "free" from our parents' parenting in a sense. And yet she knows that in order to fulfill such a contract, she "must become a lawyer" for the family.
While such idea is commendable, when she talks to me about it, it feels twisted, almost resentful, and kind of certainly not the kind of "free to do anything" ideal that most Americans seems to want in their interpretation of liberty. The free to do anything clause was in a sense, her giving into indulgences because of the hardship and work she has to do to stay there. It's kind of a vicious cycle here, then. And what's even weirder is that whenever she needs help with something and asks for it, she doesn't really want to learn the reason why but just the "how" to do something. I used to get irritated at this, because the hyper-practicality makes me feel more like a tool rather than a person giving time to explain and teach. It's like giving into an opposite version of "do as I say, not as I do" , making it "do as I do, not as I say".
But I ask myself now how this whole analysis is relevant? For one, I'm back here in DC and Mica's alone in New York. I quickly "left her" as soon as I got the chance to in that sense. I indeed given up (for which I am remorseful for), thinking that she couldn't (or wouldn't) understand where I'm coming from, especially with the whole debate on being free to do what you want. When we discuss and then eventually argue, it seems that it's hard for Mica to fight with me honestly because she may not be sure of herself either. What she is sure of is the idle talk of ideals in colleges now "people are free to come to their own interpretations about anything". It's such an obvious statement... of course people are free to their own interpretations about anything. What's lacking in this statement? Well a moral judgement. And when there is something lacking, people can attach things. For example: "people are free to their own [wrong] interpretations about anything". But that's not the ideal at hand here in this ordinary thought. In fact, it's more like people's own opinions are all right in their own way.
Here we have yet another partial truth. When people feel strongly about something, it is indeed probably true in some respect. However as a Christian I'm led to remember what sin is: Sin comes from love as well but love for something that is "lesser", be it "less good" or straight up "wholly evil". Choosing something less good in the strictest sense is considered evil especially if one knows that there's a better chance. I have to keep myself accountable for this as well. Here is yet another weird attack on truth by partial and unthoughtful truisms. Relativism is dangerous and paradoxical in this sense, especially when used as an actual way of life and not just an argument, because it advocates to do away with something that is better. Sure it is hard to ascertain it, and even the most studied of people can be wrong despite advocating for the good. But morality shouldn't be politicized; morality is for all.
This is what I mean on how "letting be" can get out of hand, and is the object of my confusion here, of which I only hope to pray for being graced with as I continue my own studies and my own journey in faith. I acknowledge my limited knowledge and understanding here is rather the probable reason.
An excerpt from Ratzinger's book struck me yesterday and I told Arie about it. It seemed obvious to her, but I went about summarizing his analysis of the parable of the two brothers (as he prefers over the parable of the prodigal son). I just opened my Bible now and read it from Luke 15:11-31. The parable, in short, speaks of a son who asked for his share of his father's fortune to go out into the city. His father obliges and he goes out but spends every penny on it in "loose living", which led him to eventually finding work in a famine stricken area as a swine herd's help, happy to eat the pods used to feed swine. He realizes how wrong he is and resolves to make things right by confessing to his father "Father I have sinned against heaven and before you; I am no longer worthy to be called your son; treat me as one of your hired servants" (Luke 15: 18-19). And when he did so, the father interjected him and forgave him, celebrating the return of his son.
I reflected on this for the past 2 days and thought of Mica or Anya or anyone really. Are they also in their own prodigal son/daughter scenario? Should this be a foundation for "letting them be"? But as soon as I think this, I'm humbled myself of why Ratzinger prefers the parable to be called the parable of the two sons or the forgiving father– the other son is complacent and even resentful of his brother being forgiven. This other brother too, though so "steeped" in the comfort of the faith, was still in the wrong when he acted in that way. But the loving father is sure to forgive this son too, assuring him "Son, you are always with me, and all that is mine is yours. It was fitting to make merry and be glad, for this your brother was dead, and is alive; he was lost, and is found" (Luke 15:31-32). So I too, having reconciled my faith (and still in the process of reconciling) must always be aware of getting too complacent within the faith. This is why I think mission is important, because it challenges one's faith to being active as we are called to be in the world– "If you were of the world, the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you." (John 15: 19). And not only this but to be empowered by grace, and to cultivate it faith, so that "when the spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth" (John 16:13).
And there's even more to the story for me to identify with as well. I too was the prodigal son in that I fell away from my "home", living a largely agnostic secularist life while in college, but always kind of drawn to the idea of truth, which I thought the roman catholic church too rule-based (just as Ben Gibbard thought) to actually help me access it based on structure alone. But when I returned to the faith, oh how rich it is to read and be educated in catechesis. It is indeed the religious education that enriches all of the sacraments we can find boring.
So where does this leave me at least in my state of questioning this strategy to "let her be"? I can't merely just say "it's her life so she should do what she wants" any more than I can say that for myself. The good life is indeed the better life, and I'm always reminded by Pope John Paul II's take on freedom: "Freedom consists not in doing what we like, but in having the right to do what we ought".
From the beginning, "man and woman; he created them" (Genesis 1:27) to have a personal relationship with Him, for which we have the freedom to freely choose God who is love and who is of utmost goodness. And it is such then that my resolve is to turn my attitude towards another not in terms of just cranking out a strategy such as "let her be", but to consider carefully each situation so that justice and what is due to each person is given. The slightest of grace that I can give in the form of light reminders can go a long way in helping them realize on their own freedom and not from my coercion/persuasion, that they freely chose the good. It is then that I turn to furthering more this idea of freedom and truth coming from that famous quote by actually reading the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, from which Pope John Paul II's teaching for the Catholic Church on freedom and truth is most officially and most authoritatively preached.
Couple thoughts about Jean-Luc Marion's Phenomenology of Faith via Givenness
A photo of the Georgetown Waterfront from a run I had
It is easy to do a Bible study and to say that God speaks to me through the readings, that faith is a "given". But really, what does that mean? Do we take faith to be given as "a given", or a dogmatic assumption? I was thinking about this today on my walk. How do I engage with other people such as atheists or those of other faiths, if we don't take (theologically) faith as a given?
To define the parameter of faith here includes the assumption of a God. And I agree with this. However, I think this is a conclusion of the finding that faith is given. The philosopher-theologian Jean-Luc Marion takes this question up in his work through Godwithout Being to the series that begins with Givenness and Revelation. Contrary to Heidegger, who thinks that Dasein is the primary and basic pre-theoretical feature of Being, Marion provides a correction that the character of "givenness" is the beginning. As far as I understand it, this is going back to Descartes, whom all of the aforementioned phenomenologists seem to need to take their shot at. But the context is that Descartes begins with a radical position from a radical method: from doubting everything he could doubt, he comes up with the theory "cogito ergo sum", I think therefore I am.
Marion, in Descartes' Passive Thought , focuses more on Descartes' other conclusion "Ego Sum Ego Existo", I am, therefore I exist. While I have yet to complete his work, I have found from his analysis of the 6th meditation and the passions that Descartes' position does not fundamentally doubt the body's role in all this. That is, when we doubt everything we could possibly doubt, it is not so certain that Descartes doubts the body. Sure he can say that maybe a demon messed with him and made him think he had a body, but the characteristic of having a body is not removed from the action of thought. "I think (with a body) that I am, therefore I exist (with a body)". It is possible, from Marion's reading, that it was just unquestionable despite Descartes' methodology rooted in what was coming to be known as the virtue of science (questioning all assumptions); that the assurance and quality of having a body is embedded into how he even comes up with it. This sounds a lot like the kind of territory that the premiere phenomenologist of the body, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, was going on about. And this makes sense, given that even he returns to Descartes in his later lectures. Of course, this could just be another assumption unquestioned, but that's the sort of fundamental ground of analyzing the phenomena that phenomenologists are interested in (intentionality a la Husserl). Science, not even philosophy of science, wouldn't be that committed to digging that deep in questioning their assumptions because this puts them in the territory of philosophy (this word is used rather pejoratively in this context).
With the centrality of the body rooted in the primer to modern philosophy, phenomenology seems to be making progress here towards many applications such as identity, health, illness, etc. But with Marion's own center of his phenomenology, that of "givenness", roots one who walks along his path of thought with theology infused with phenomenology. The character of givenness– the phenomena that we encounter having the quality of being given– invokes or implies a background idea of a "giver". In contrast with Early Heidegger's Protagoras-esque Man is the Measure of all means path of thought in Being and Time, Marion paves a path found in the more humbled (feeling, with stubborn hermit inclinations, the consequences of his idealistic mistake registering in the National Socialist German Workers party) Later Heidegger, who takes a more theological approach to the question of being.
For Marion, as with Descartes' Passive thought (thinking with the body), being is the characteristic of givenness that we take as fundamental and that we don't ponder about much in our everyday existence. The world of the given here has yet to take a definite theological tone, however. One can merely assert that the characteristic of givenness may be just that, a characteristic of experience. Evolutionary interpretations may take that to be just part of our genetic coding or wiring left over from a previous trait that, either by coincidence (vestigial) or by deliberate natural selection, we would be more "oriented" to that approach. However, this goes beyond the scope of phenomenology, which focuses on the phenomena (the things themselves) and how we experience it. In other words, we would follow Husserl and "bracket it out" (epoché), and put that reductionist explanation aside, especially if it doesn't help our phenomenological investigation. Such "orientation" may as well be characterized for the religious as how God "[formed] man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being" (Genesis 2:7). And I didn't intend to connect the concept of ground (post-modernity's bread and butter) and the phenomenology of breath (see Havi Carel, Frederik Svenaeus, etc. on illness analyses); but I certainly thought it while typing it.
So, what now with givenness? Well, describing being within the ground of givenness, one can take in Jesus' theological stride to make Simon Peter, the doubting apostle, the "rock [He] will build [His] church" with and whom to give the "keys to the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew 16:18-19), and reflect on this phenomenologically. While we may doubt that which is given (be it from confusion, anxiety, or existential inquiry), Christianity argues faith arises out of a gift by recognizing the giver of the given as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. As Paul writes "for by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God" (Ephesians 2:8) and such faith enters us through love as "God is love" (1 John 4). This is where Marion ties up how the description of givenness is fulfilled wholly by Catholic-Christian doctrine as the "gift" is manifested in the Eucharist, the bread as the body of Christ, and of the Church as the body of Christ instituted by Christ (see Called to Communion, Pope Emeritus Ratzinger). This is also where Marion turns from philosophy (via phenomenology) to theology, by taking "This Jesus [as] the stone which, rejected by you builders, has become the chief stone supporting all the rest" (Acts 4:11), and by fusing phenomenologically the given body with the Christian soul, giving kind of a dualistic twist but more a hermeneutical interpretation rooted in the ahistory of the Bible and the history of man's existence.
At this point Marion takes up the theologian's humility and would take his theology just to be mere applied philosophy/science, that is, applying "reason" to discover more about God's creation/design for us as creatures. All of this can be undertaken without the scholastic acrobatics that Thomism, while important, because it draws upon the investigation into subjectivity of faith that began with St. Augustine and continued with Pascal, Kierkegaard and then initially with really early Heidegger (back when he was in the seminary); there's likely many in between but I'm not aware of them, I admit. Because an investigation into faith begets an investigation into the giver, which then leads back to the given; we come to know God so that we may know ourselves, as St. Augustine says– Noverim Te, Noverim me.
It's half past midnight and I have just finished reading Alain Badiou's "In praise of love" in one sitting. I had a mind to write my initial impressions but have come to type these letters now to reflect more closely on the nature of my philosophical drives. It is captivating for Badiou's rather different translation of Book V of the Republic to let socrates speak:
Anyone who doesn't take love as their starting point will never discover what philosophy is about.
And I'm led to reflect more deeply on this because this is precisely what I got into this whole philosophy business (or hobby) in the first place! It was in fact Jackie's inquisitiveness and curiosity, while in the throes of love, that has seeded in me the origin of my awakening– love was the seed, the thoughts and actions that ensued, its conditions. And I think that what led me to this book, that analysis of that Rick and Morty episode on online dating by Wisecrack (see embed video below), got Badiou wrong. I was led to believe that Badiou was philosophizing saying that love is about tenacity and endurance. And boy that was definitely not what Badiou is saying at all! Well he does say it, but only in part. And taking the part to represent the whole is a dangerous affair. With Wisecrack, it appears to serve their purposes in explaining the critique given by the episode of Rick and Morty– to shit on online dating apps just as Badiou did on online dating sites. But this is where Wisecrack stops Badiou rather abruptly. Where they emphasize love's longevity (which primarily attracted me), they fail to mention this longevity as more than just the mood of escaping the "happily ever after" framework. What they fail to mention is the more profound beginnings Badiou alludes to, of which Husserl christens philosophy as the science of conceptions that requires a perpetual beginner– that is that love is "minimal communism"; love is a "two-scene", love is ultimately a "truth process". These concepts, albeit fairly new to me, resonate in me because they help clarify the kind of universality of love that I got to realize by this artful project. I came here on Wisecrack's quote thinking I can see if I can identify with this love as tenacity, trying to justify what I went through with Jackie as being precisely that– of a particular instance. But I was wrong; and glad to be. Love, as I understand him, is an affirmation of the eternal that is juxtaposed in the temporal life. Just like philosophy, love is a perpetual beginner. As Badiou quotes Sarkovsky, Love requires reinvention. In such a way, perhaps I can add that love is itself a philosophy. Moreso, the philosophy of love is indeed the philosophy of philosophy qua loving wisdom. I wonder about my thomistic friends/professors in SMC who reaffirm Aquinas' mantra that Love is to will the Good of the other, with the underlying Christian theme of the givenness of love, which has been ever so powerful on me as my Catholicism buds with the help of Augustine's Confessions. And it seems to me that my general point, my purpose and driving force behind my pursuit in philosophy– into questions of ontology, phenomenology, existentialism– all is driven from this fundamental seed of love. And I've expressed in numerous blogs how I'm grateful to Jackie for implanting philosophy into me but perhaps I can recant this now and offer a clearer thought– Jackie helped the conditions for my philosophical soul to emerge, like fertilizer or water or sunlight. She became my conception of the "Good", as Iris Murdoch's conception of a good love speaks. And it's now clear to me, at least in this moment, that most thematically, I end up thinking about love in the philosophy I read. Iris Murdoch x Simone Weil's conception of love as a distinct form of attention held up by our moral/ontological commitments to the good or lack thereof (making "bad love" as a neglect of the Good, fitting in the Christian framework). Aquinas/Augustine frameworks of love in terms of the transcendent Lord and Christ for us. The existentialist counterargument of a secular (in one extreme) or humanist existential form of love. And I think Badiou was able to help push these thoughts I've reflected on love further. And in good timing. With the chains of love that I've been bounded on are loosened and my existential crisis averted, I can now see more authentically how this fits into my life and how Badiou's conception seems to be at least a more clear definition of this sense of love that I have experienced, and perhaps haven't given up on (or have? his distinction between friendship and love becomes murky to me when considering a love lost but recovered as friendship?). Either way, the 108 or less pages that I read from front to back was clear and stimulating enough for me to be able to think those thoughts he has written to impart onto my own consciousness. There is much thought to be thunk that stimulates my brain and soul to meditate on further. For as a Christian I'm obliged to read other secular works in the light of Christ, and hence in the light of love (qua agape); and I can begin to sketch those details in my head already. But in the intermediary of this now, I can understand the framework in the appreciation of its technicality– of the work's ability to synthesize conceptions of love with its own past conceptions and also fused with my own notions. It is profound but not overly so, because it takes its stance on love with much care and especially with its reflection on theater and how philosophers at the end of the day are actors (albeit sometimes unaware of it). The overall performance of it, and the phenomenological underpinnings, leads to the description of love phenomenologically, of which despite Heidegger only mentioned in passing in a citation of Derrida's book on him, that strengthens the hermeneutic project that the hermit Heidegger had begun on his own, that has affected the generations and beyond after him. This talk on love goes down to the level of questioning being itself, of which I'm particularly interested in as an academic and truth-pursuing exercise. I keep saying I agree with Badiou on most parts because I'm reticent to dive into its metaphysical commitments, but am thankful for the lines he draws on what he is talking about and his explanation of how he uses the jargon he uses, which he humbly acknowledges but can't seem to not use. The name of my game is being, that of which medicine has practically and metaphysically supplements. The way Badiou talks about love as truth seeking and how it is "two not one" and all, helps me interpret it phenomenologically in my own way– that I see love as yet another manifestation, or dimension of being. And as the conclusion which I think I'm to arrive at but have yet to trace a line to– that being is time (as Heidegger claims in "Time and Being")– becomes more clear, the more that I'm renewed to pursue it again with Socrates' requirement in mind for philosophy. Not merely a sense of wonder but also with love as the basis and starting point of that sense of wonder. Dogmatism beware, as I tread and tiptoe between the lines of blasphemy and doxa; I risk the failings of both in pursuit of the truth that love, philosophy, human consciousness, takes as its meaning. And in the end, it seems that Christianity may win at the end, as I think I'll inevitably admit as descript: love is given. And what is given, must imply the giver. This win, which drives the whole "comedy" gamut of Christianity, that love wins at the end, is not mutually exclusive, I think, with the human flourishing, of exploring concepts as they circulate and exist in our space and time, because ultimately I still see this whole adventure as part of the journey towards revelation and truth via Faith, Hope and Charity, either way. I can only hope that grace can nudge me in the right direction before it's too late (and I mean too late not temporally as in after x amount of years and x amount of days, but rather the orientation of the soul willingly losing its trajectory).
I messaged my long estranged older sister with a belated birthday message, to the ire of my little sisters who thought I put too much effort in it. I replied "sincerity is scary", quoting the 1975's tried and true single from their latest album "A Brief Inquiry into Online Relationships". I then proceeded to listen to the song, having not listened to it for months now. I had instead been shuffling a playlist of the songs I listened to in high school, trying to find a piece of myself that was lost.
As I listen to the song (and subsequently the whole album), I can hear a little bit past the 1975's rather outlandish brand of pretentious yet catchy lyrics about postmodernism, kitsch, and what not. There was a theme that suddenly clicked when in "love it if we made it", Healy sings "modernity has failed us, but I love it if we made it". This kind of critical reflection is both regretful but at the same time authentic in affirming the saying 'love it if we made it'. This rather pithy remark of blasé optimism captures the kind of mood that brings about a nihilistic yet Camusian brand of absurdism: "The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart." (see Myth of Sisyphus). Although Camus ends this essay the sentence after this with "One must imagine sisyphus happy", that kind of idealism that powered the existentialist movement would be lost to us living in our present age.
And this is exactly the kind of thing that defines what the 1975 is more than their reference to Kerouac's On the Road. Their music which sounds outside its time, which harkens back to exactly that age (late 1970s-80s) that tries to use its platform to challenge, synthesize and question the norm, is a tough balancing act. The melodies are catchy and even sometimes outlandish to the point that some people sing along to it anyway like the previous generation sang to Anthony Kiedis' Californication ("psychic spies from china try to steal your mind's elation"?). So in a way the general following that professes to "like" the 1975 would be people who chant their mantra without much thought besides the feeling of the hook: "and I love it if we made it"; yeah that makes sense let's chant it again! This is pushed back by their die hard fans who profess to relate to the band's mission, creating some kind of youth movement. But the 1975 are too vague to be profound, instead fueling the agendas of their box fans in the general "air" of their mannerisms from british accents to using the strange words they use in regular conversation. Emotionally enflamed, a 1975 concert would ignite a die hard crowd with an paradox: each one having their own relation to their understanding of what the 1975 is trying to tell everyone while also contradicting the guy to their right or the woman two rows ahead.
But I am giving them (both the band and the fans) too much credit. It is rather the central theme of love that the 1975 takes as their muse, which they situate their nostalgia (but not) brand in our present time. There seems to always be some kind of other nostalgia they are opposing though, so they don't embrace nostalgia in general. For example, in "Nana", Healy sings about his grandma's ("nana") death, grieving with this bittersweet tune: "I don't like it now you're dead, it's not the same when I scratch my own head, I haven't got the nails for it". Following up this rather morbid tune is setting up the opposition: "I know that God doesn't exist, and all of the love that surrounded it, but I like to think you hear me sometimes"; which is a flagrantly poetic statement of atheism. It is painted as nostalgia but also as a revisionist nostalgia, the kind that obviously beckons the "viewing the world through rose tinted glasses" cliché; a kind of confirmation bias for a dusty memory stowed in a closet, forgotten to be moved into the even dustier attic.
Yet the solution in this song isn't even a viable alternative to the religious life. Healy suggests poetry and songwriting to help him deal with death: "melody line for you tonight... think that's how to make things feel alright. Made in my room this simple tune, always keep me close to you. The crowds will sing, the voices ring and it's like you never left; but I'm bereft you see, I think you can tell– I haven't been doing too well...". But even then it's sad but perhaps he is a realist– wallowing in a sad reality at least is living in reality for what it is. But even this falls apart– he's still "bereft" despite the empty response he gets when he tries to call his nana to him (in spite of the chanting crowds). The only optimistic take home one can take is that reflection is a somber solution that can help one get by. It's "authentic" and "real".
But really what is description without action? As C.S. Lewis is often quoted: "Education without values, as useful as it is, seems rather to make man a more clever devil". In our secular time, this may seem rather decrepit and outdated while also making a little bit of sense if we remove the religious connotations to "devil" and just use the colloquial term. But even the colloquial term has hidden within it the etymological history of slandering and attacking. Rooted in this term is that idea that if people don't have normative rules that they refine through education, they are just reinforcing the nature to debase another person for one's own gain.
And so, even after coming back to the 1975 after a trite counter remark to my little sister's comment, I can feel that pull towards the world that the 1975 wants us to be in– a boxed echo chamber where "love" is mistaken for lust (see Tootimetootime) or even abandoned as an ideal altogether (see change of heart). A lot of the songs that the 1975 put out in their discography seem to follow a kind of continuity: "The City" is referenced in "A Change of Heart", for example; further reinforcing this emo-sisyphean approach.
In a positive light, the 1975's music is a kind of therapy session for the self, where one feels comfortable to speak their mind without judgment. But this can be seen positively only if we squint at seeing it this way (and even then find it hard to believe); because they blast out or have the vocals still in front of a slow ballad (Be my mistake, Nana, She lays down). One who does this self-therapy, painting emotions and really "dwelling" in it is Grouper (see clearing, I'm clean now and holding). Although in fairness Grouper has a far less reach than the net that the 1975 casts; must one compromise intelligibility for popularity? I don't think so. And it pains me to write this because I do like The 1975 because I also like to dwell while also sing a long to catchy and happy sounding melodies (primed by my love for Death Cab for Cutie), because the paradox of comedy in the light of tragedy seems more real than merely being a sad boi about it (which one usually progresses from and gets tired of eventually).
So as a band, the 1975 are pretty solid. But they can't teach me anything that I don't already know. They can be clever while never having any value other than being a point of reflection for why their brand of pseudo-sorrowful comfort beats seemed like a good solution to escape it all, but when out of it, you realize that they never really provided any new insight– they are such beautiful post-scripts to more serious work yet so unaware of it.
